FOR PAS

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AN INTERVIEW WITH PATRICK J. McGARVEY

FRED FISKE: We're talking to Patrick J. McGarvey, who is author of a new book titled "CIA: The Myth and the Madness." Patrick McGarvey worked in the field of intelligence for fourteen years, worked in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, in Vietnam; travelled widely throughout the Far East. In recent years he served in Paris as an intelligence aide to the military representative at the Paris Peace Talks. He's worked closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an intelligence adviser. He's the recipient of the Outstanding Performance Award for work done on the Vietnam problem and in the Paris peace talks. Now he's written a book which, in many ways, is quite critical of the CIA and our intelligence operation generally. It's published, by the way, by the Saturday Review Press.

Why did you feel it was necessary to write this book, Pat?

PATRICK J. McGARVEY: Well, I think, essentially, it's contained in the title. I call it the myth and the madness. Today there seems to be a popular myth afoot that's been abetted, of course, by television and Hollywood that the CIA is a ten foot giant capable of any act of derring-do it so decides to pull. In reality it's a human organization replete with all the problems and foibles that any other large organization has and, in many cases, more problems. It seems to be quite bureaucratic, perhaps a little more so than other elements of government because it has the veil of secrecy.

FISKE: Now how did you come to the CIA? I recall from your book that you became involved in intelligence work in the service first, didn't you?

McGARVEY: That's correct. And I was recruited by the CIA. I was on leave from the Air Force in Philadelphia, which is my home. And I was contacted in a rather C-grade movie style by a recruiter in the city of Philadelphia who called me up. A Greek, who went by the name of Mr. Z, asked me if I'd

be interested in working in the CIA.

FISKE: He knew of your work in the service?

McGARVEY: Apparently so. I don't know how they got my name, although there was a CIA representative at the SAC headquarters where I was working in an intelligence unit there.

FISKE: He called you and said 'meet me in my car; I'll pick you up,' just like they do in the movies?

McGARVEY: Exactly. It was at a railroad station in suburban Philadelphia at 2:30 on a Sunday afternoon. And I was to be on the platform and he'd pull up in a white Buick covertible, which he did. I met him there and he interviewed me for about fifteen or twenty minutes and took hurried notes on the back of an envelope and said I'll see you later; I'll get in touch with you. A week or so later he called me back and he said he'd meet me on the el platform at 69th and Market Street in Philadelphia. I stood there on a Thursday afternoon at 3:30. He got off the el, handed me a fistful of papers which were forms to fill out for government employment and an appointment slip to take an eight hour mental and physical exam at Penn State University, which I did.

FISKE: Is that the way they recruit people to this day? I mean they hire thousands and thousands of people, don't they?

McGARVEY: I don't know that it's thousands and thousands, but I know the Mickey-Mouse still goes on in the recruiting end.

FISKE: I mean everybody knows we have a CIA office. Right? They have a personnel department...

McGARVEY: That's correct.

FISKE: What's the idea of that?

McGARVEY: I was recruited for what they called at that time the junior officer training program. And they took about a hundred and fifty people a year. They give you a full year of training, rather intensive, and they sort of hope that that training program will produce the middle and upper level management people for intelligence as their career evolves.

FISKE: And your intelligence, as you detail in your book -- it's one of the very humorous parts of your book -- most of the book isn't humorous, of course, at all -- involved some more Mickey-Mouse -- right? -- like games where you'd go out with an instructor and try to tail him through department stores?

McGARVEY: Oh, right. We had the old classic espionage

training program where we had surveillance training. And the instructor would lead us through the lingerie department and stand there and fondle all the niceties. And we were supposed to very awkwardly hide ourselves behind racks of night gowns and what not, because if we were spotted by him and recognized, of course, we'd blown ourselves and that was the end of our participation in that particular exercise.

FISKE: Did you think at that time that you were getting into a Mickey-Mouse outfit, or were you impressed with all of this?

McGARVEY: I was so thoroughly impressed it was unbelievable, and most of us were too, because the time was important too. It was in the early 1960's. And we were all impressed by the rhetoric of John Kennedy, of course -- "Ask not what you can do for your country." And most young fellows in their twenties at that time thought that government service was the only place to be.

And of course the field of foreign affairs was quite active in the early sixties. So we had elements of a holy crusade and old time religion all mixed up into our emotional scene when we were going through the training program. And in effect, we became true believers.

FISKE: Let me ask you this question, Pat. You spent fourteen years of your life in this intelligence work. You were a true believer when you came in. You still believe in the importance of intelligence work. You just don't believe that it's being done right now. You advanced to a rather high level, didn't you? You were involved in some interesting and sensitive work. Why did you leave?

McGARVEY: That's a very tough question to answer for me. I left for a lot of reasons. I guess most specifically probably is Vietnam. I worked that problem for several years. I reached a point where I felt that I was meeting myself coming to work in the morning. We had a period when the Nixon administration first came in when it seemed that there might be a chance for some rational thinking about the Vietnamese situation. Henry Kissinger wrote his National Security Memo #1 in which he listed twenty-nine questions on Vietnam. And we were allowed to open all the closets, bring out all the skeletons, open all the hampers and bring out all the dirty laundry and re-examine all the evidence on which the Vietnam policy was based. And of course, intelligence is knee deep, or neck deep, in the policy making of the whole Vietnam error.

Well, there was a very refreshing period for three or four months there when we all went through this exercise in the first few months of 1969. But by the spring and summer

of '69, it became evident to myself and many others that the policy was going to remain the same as it was under Lyndon Johnson, that we were going to pursue a military course. And I personally just felt, well...

FISKE: You were aware then that some of the stuff that we were reading about concerning the Pueblo, for example, was really not true?

McGARVEY: Well, it's not that it's not true. It's just that I guess intelligence's biggest fault today is not its acts of commission, but its acts of omission. And of course at the level of the secretary of Defense and the White House when we have an incident like the Pueblo, what's important is what is not said rather than what is said.

And in the Pueblo the facts that were given to the public were straightforward. But the facts that were not given to the public are the ones that I think are the acts of omission that were rather questionable.

FISKE: You mean, for example, that an officer in evaluating this information made a judgment that may have been in error? I recall from you book, for example, that he decided to give the Navy the benefit of the doubt...

McGARVEY: This is right, yes.

FISKE: Would you tell our listeners about that.

McGARVEY: Well, exactly. There was a situation there where the White House asked, for example, had the Pueblo, in fact, gone into North Korean waters past the twelve mile limit. We went over the radar tracking reports that were available and pointed out four specific instances in three days previous to its seizure that it had, in fact, violated North Korean territorial waters.

Now anyone familiar with the diplomatic atmosphere in North Korea at that time could only conclude that they were sticking their nose into a very tender situation. The North Korean government was quite uptight about their relations with South Korea at that time. They had just pulled off the Blue House raid in Seoul. The situation was extremely tense.

But information was never given out to the public that it had in fact violated North Korean territorial waters prior to the seizure. Secretary McNamara came the closest to admitting that publicly in an interview with Max Frankel of the New York Times. When asked directly had the Pueblo in fact violated North Korean waters, McNamara said he's not so certain, or something vague to that degree.

FISKE: At one point in your book in talking about the military intelligence, DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, you say that it's an old saw among people engaged in intelligence work in the Pentagon that the DIA exists really to justify that the operations of the J-3...

McGARVEY: That's correct.

FISKE: ...want to do. Can the same be said of the CIA? Are you called upon to justify actions which the Joint Chiefs or the President have already decided they're going to take?

McGARVEY: Well, in the Vietnam case, I don't know that that's true. The CIA -- well, the JCS sort of pulled an end run on CIA. CIA's role in policy making or the policy influence in the period of Vietnam was relatively minimal, primarily because of Walt Rostow and President Johnson's propensity to go with the military judgment on such things.

Now, CIA's skirts are not entirely clean in that regard. They had their own areas of vested interest, such as the pacification program. They ran that program in South Vietnam up through 1967. During that period of time no national intelligence estimate was written which said the pacification program was not working very well. But as soon as the Army finally wrestled control of that away from CIA, it was within months that CIA put out a very blistering intelligence estimate assessing that the pacification program was going to hell in a handbasket.

So we all have our ax to grind. It just depends on whose barn is going to burn at a particular time.

FISKE: One of the things that disenchanted you most about intelligence work was that people had axes to grind, that we had a lot of duplication, that, in addition to the CIA, we have other intelligence gathering agencies in our government, that the competition between them and their allegiance to their particular arm of government makes for an inefficient operation, doesn't it?

McGARVEY: Yes, that's true. That's quite true. Today there are a hundred and fifty thousand people in the intelligence community in the ten federal departments of government involved in intelligence. And for anyone to think of CIA...

FISKE: Wouldn't that be a classified item?

McGARVEY: Not really. If one dug into the appropriations hearings on the Hill, you could ferret out those kinds of figures.

FISKE: I wondered when I read that in your book -- saw that figure -- and also saw the figure that we spend five

billion dollars a year on intelligence -- and I'd never seen that figure before -- I know a lot of people have wondered what we spend on intelligence -- that's not classified either?

McGARVEY: No, I got that figure also from the appropriations hearings and also, I think, in the New York Times. But you know, you get into the area of intelligence budgets and intelligence spending -- and that's a sensitive one with me -- the rationale given for keeping intelligence budgets secret is that primarily we don't want the opposition -- that is, the Soviet intelligence, the KGB -- to know how much we're spending on intelligence. And if you stop and think about that, that's rather fallacious. Because, first of all, the Soviet intelligence officers who are working the America Desk in Moscow obviously have a pretty good handle on how much we are spending exactly, because they see our operations going around the world. And the only people who really get short-changed in this process of keeping a veil of secrecy in front of the budget are the American people who pay the bill and, secondly, the American Congress, who supposedly are to appropriate the moneys for intelligence. But the only money that Congress sees is CIA's housekeeping budget for its headquarters in Washington. They don't see any of the operational budget. They don't see -- well, all the rest of the intelligence budget is buried in Agriculture, in HEW, in HUD and all other elements of the federal budget under miscellaneous items.

FISKE: This is one of the most glaring things that you would like to see changed.

McGARVEY: I think that would be the healthiest arena in which to start to try to bring about some realistic reforms in intelligence. Power flows where the money goes is the old adage. And as long as they're allowed a fairly free rein on budgeting, there's going to be no control.

FISKE: Let me pause here for just a moment if I may...

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FISKE: Our "Empathy" guest is Patrick J. McGarvey, who's written a book titled "CIA: The Myth and the Madness."

How long did it take you after you were recruited by the CIA to discover that it wasn't what we see in the movies?

McGARVEY: Well, I think it wasn't too long after. There were some rather humorous incidents that happened to me. When I first came to Washington, I was told not to rent or buy a place to live until I touched base with the CIA headquarters, because I was going undercover. Now that all sounds very exciting, except my cover was as a language research specialist in the Department of the Army Library. Now...

FISKE: What were you -- a Chinese language specialist?

McGARVEY: That's right, in the Air Force.

FISKE: Yes.

McGARVEY: So I was set up this rather elaborate cover in which I was given an Army ID card, an office number and a telephone number at the Pentagon. And I was to tell everyone that I worked there, when, in reality, of course, I worked in Langley or McLean, Virginia, some ten miles away from the Pentagon. My wife and I got an apartment in Fairfax, Virginia. And a day or two after we moved we're strolling around on the outside one evening. A fellow about my own age, a captain in the Army, and his wife who lived upstairs were walking around. And we shook hands and introduced. He said where do you work. I said at the Pentagon. He says, hey, that's where I work too. And right away he says, how about you and I forming a car pool. So what do you say to a guy like that? You know, say no, I really don't work there? No. I pull out my CIA rule book and I check it out and say, well, I'm not really interested in a car pool. And the guy leans on me and says, look. He says, the traffic on Saturday evening's ridiculous around. And he says, my wife would like to have the car during the week. We could alternate -- Monday, Wednesday and Friday and Tuesday and Thursday. We'd each drive.

So I say, well, no. I said I've got to work late at the office a lot at night. And he gives me a fish eye, like who works at the Army Library late at night.

So then finally he was really desperate. And he ups the ante. And he says to me -- he says, look. He said we can over to the Fort Myer Officer's Club, sit there and have a cold beer and wait till all the traffic dies down and then drive home leisurely. And, of course, that's the last bastion of a five cent beer on the East Coast of the United States. But I still had to turn the guy down because I simply wasn't working at the Pentagon.

The end result was the guy turned away. He walked away muttering something about damn civilians. And to make matters worse, every morning and every evening for the next year he and I would come out of our apartments about the same time, drive off, and get home from work within five minutes of each other every night.

FISKE: You're a real nice neighbor. Did your wife know where you were really working?

McGARVEY: Oh, yes. Yes. She did. But they took the wives in and they gave them an indoctrination...

FISKE: But where do they draw the line? There're a lot of things that you can't even tell your wife. Right?

McGARVEY: Well, I don't even want to get into that.

FISKE: Why?

McGARVEY: Well, I mean you're going to get me in a situation with my wife now.

FISKE: Have you -- Mrs. McGarvey, have you known what he's been doing all these years?

McGARVEY: Well, let me tell you something. I go home to Philadelphia where I've got a great number of Irish Catholic relatives. And I get these all-knowing pokes in the ribs from my uncles, who are detectives on the police force. And they say, "Look, Pat. Don't tell me. I know what you're up to. You're still with CIA. They're setting you up in a deep cover bureau, right? Nobody in the world is going to suspect you, who's going out and writing an angry book about intelligence, of actually still being with those guys." And they want to believe that.

FISKE: That's a very funny bit.

Well, a lot of this intelligence gathering is -- we spend millions of dollars. You say five billion dollars on it. We're a little bit overboard on technology, another one of the claims that you make which we can get into. But still, basically, some of our actions are taken on the basis of intelligence which really are reports from the field which are exaggerated. And you go into this in some detail about body counts, for example, or airplane kills. All during the years of the Vietnam war, if you totalled up all the claimed casualties that we have inflicted...

McGARVEY: Yes, exactly.

FISKE: ...on the enemy, we killed everybody in Vietnam three or four times over.

McGARVEY: Well, a beautiful example is the trucks in North Vietnam. We've run through the North Vietnamese truck inventory. And I'm not kidding; this is very serious. Statistically, they've run out of trucks nine times. And that was from '65 until '69 when I left intelligence. But they reached a theoretical point of having no more trucks nine times.

And this occurs from situations where a flight of two or three jet planes will strafe six trucks on the road. Now all they do after they let their bombs go is look back over their right shoulder and see the mushrooming smoke clouds of

their bombs. The intelligence requirements on these guys is to give an accurate assessment of what kind of damage they've made. So the lead man says, well, I destroyed two, damaged two, and two got away. So the guy flying behind him -- he wants to get a piece of the action too. So he says, well, I destroyed three and damaged two. So you end up -- you come back and you've got eighteen trucks involved, and nine of them were destroyed and nine are damaged. In reality, there were only six in the beginning, and they missed all six of them because they all pulled off the road into a ditch.

FISKE: Yes.

You also make quite clear in your book, "CIA: The Myth and the Madness," that we just gather too doggone much information of all kinds to really physically be able to distill it sensibly.

McGARVEY: That's one of the essential basic problems. Since the early sixties and the satellites and overhead photography and other sophisticated electronic forms of collection, we've reached the point where we had [sic] just so much information that it was unbelievable. In the line of work that I was in in the Far East, for example, we used to monitor radio communications. I would venture to say that radio communication probably represents maybe forty to fifty percent of the intelligence every day. There's about a hundred and fifty tons of paper collected a day, or information put on paper a day just in radio communications. Now radar and other electronic intercepts are far more voluminous. And one of the congressmen on the Hill -- I think it was Jamie Whitten -- pointed out that we seem to have a Sears Roebuck catalogue filled with information, but by the time they get through reading that catalogue the crisis that that catalogue is designed to prevent has already taken place, because we couldn't read through them.

FISKE: Well, basically then, would you say that our intelligence gathering apparatus is doing the job for which it was formed or not?

McGARVEY: I don't think it is. I think we're reaching a point where we rely on technology far, far too much. We have a situation where...

FISKE: You mean rather than human judgment...

McGARVEY: That's right.

FISKE: ...and skill?

McGARVEY: Let me try to put an analogy together. Let's assume that the Soviet Union and Communist China are represented by a guy lying in a hospital bed, and the national interest of the United States [illegible]

we think he's going to get out of bed. Okay. In classic espionage days we'd have a guy sneak by that bedroom every night, slip into the room, put his finger on the guy's pulse and check him out, and he'd write a report and say he's still alive; figure maybe in a week he'll be out of bed.

But today we're in a situation where we've got fourteen guys in the closet of that bedroom or hospital room, and they've got an EKG machine; they've got an electroencephalogram machine; they know how long his toenails are; they know how much lint is collecting in his navel. They know all of these things. And then visualize somebody turning the lights out and switching the machines around to the wrong people. In other words, the man on the EKG machine is actually reading the man's blood pressure, and you've just got chaos. You've just got too much information.

FISKE: Well how did it develop into this?

McGARVEY: It's not solely the fault of intelligence. It's the trend in this country to rely on technology. And of course, the computer -- that has created a subculture within the culture of intelligence. The computer has aided and abetted this great mushrooming of collection, because it allows the intelligence machine to ingest more and more and more. Now it doesn't necessarily digest what it ingests.

FISKE: Uh-huh.

Let me pause here for a station break. Let me also invite our listeners to become involved in this. We're talking about the intelligence operations of the United States. Our guest is Patrick J. McGarvey, who has written a very readable book, a very revealing book, titled "CIA: The Myth and the Madness." And he did this after spending some fourteen years myself working in the field of intelligence.

Our phone number is 589-9912. If you have questions or comments, please call and turn down your radio when you do.

* * *

FISKE: All right. Pat McGarvey, does security become a fetish with us?

McGARVEY: Well, it certainly does. Another example in the humorous vein. In Hong Kong, as I pointed out in the book, there was an effort to try to determine the extent of the Chinese Communist nuclear development. Someone theorized that if we got a hold of the innards of Mainland Chinese cattle we could take these back and our scientific analysts could take them apart and dissect them and sample them and get a feel for the radioactive fallout over Communist China and, thereby, deduce what the Chinese Communists were up to in that field.

Well, in Hong Kong, there's any number of slaughterhouses where Mainland cattle is processed. Now security being uppermost in the CIA's mind, they devised an operational set-up whereby we were to surveil and pinpoint and identify potential agent sources working in the slaughterhouse. Now this process takes an elaborate amount of time and a lot of energy and a lot of effort. So in the end this was done. An old, beaten up, charing hag who worked in the back part where they took the pigs from the trucks and threw them onto the ground and slit their throats volunteered after pressure was put upon her to take -- snatch cows' livers and other internal organs and slip them to a CIA agent, who, in turn, put them into a baggie, packed the baggie in dry ice and stapled a report form onto it and mailed it air mail back to the headquarters in Washington.

FISKE: Wow.

McGARVEY: Now, all this could have been done or avoided by walking up to the front of the slaughterhouse and buying the same thing.

FISKE: Yes, but it wasn't nearly as dramatic.

McGARVEY: It's a lot more fun to do it that way, and you keep an awful lot of guys working.

FISKE: It's just a peculiar kind of mentality that leads to that sort of thing, right?

McGARVEY: In the trade, they call it the CI mentality, which means the counter-intelligence mentality. You've always got to have a cover story; you've always got to be aware of potential opposition. It gets -- you know, it gets to the point of "Catch 22."

FISKE: Yes, that's funny.

McGARVEY: And then another subculture of intelligence, overseas particularly, is the whole world of intelligence is one of its own. There's a war today going on with more rivalry and more hostility between British intelligence and American intelligence. Our greatest enemy abroad is the British Intelligence Service.

FISKE: Why is that? Because they're efficient?

McGARVEY: It's a tradition that they think of the American intelligence operatives as...

FISKE: Bumbling?

McGARVEY: ...upstart, young adolescents where they

themselves are the old, staid, school professionals.

FISKE: Are they in fact?

McGARVEY: I don't know. I think if I were Jimmy the Greek, I'd give them both even money really...

FISKE: Really?

McGARVEY: They're no better nor no worse than ours. But there was a situation in Singapore in 1965 when the agency, CIA, was putting a foreign ministry agent that they had "on the box," which is a polygraph -- a lie detector test. Now the Singapore chief of state, Lee Kuan Yew, blew the whistle on this thing publicly. And the reason he did was that the British Intelligence blew the whistle on CIA to Lee Kuan Yew, and, of course, he blew the whistle.

So it's another world...

FISKE: It's almost kid stuff.

McGARVEY: Almost.

FISKE: 589-9912.

This is "Empathy."

CALLER: Hello.

FISKE: You're on the air.

CALLER: Yes. I have a two-pronged question for Mr. McGarvey.

McGARVEY: Fine. I love two prongs.

CALLER: Can he hear me?

FISKE: Yes.

CALLER: All right. Some people who have read Mr. McGarvey's book say that, number one, he's putting down the United States, and, number two, he's building up communism.

Now, how would you respond to that?

McGARVEY: My response would be to say three "Our Fathers," three "Hail Marys" and make a good act of contrition. I don't think you've read the book.

CALLER: I've read part of it.

McGARVEY: Well, you haven't read it all.

CALLER: No. But....

McGARVEY: In the first chapter, I say that...

CALLER: ...United States and build up communism.

McGARVEY: Well...

FISKE: How does he build up communism?

McGARVEY: Yes. Cite me a chapter and a verse, will you?

CALLER: All right. All right. You're against CIA.

McGARVEY: Wow. Well, I'm against -- you know, well...

CALLER: Yes.

FISKE: Well, first of all, I should point out I'm sure Pat McGarvey can speak for himself very well. But I have just read the book. And he makes very clear in the book that he's not against it. He thinks intelligence gathering is vitally important to this country, as it is to other countries. He's just against the way they're doing it. Is that right, Pat?

McGARVEY: That's correct. Right.

CALLER: If Russia does it -- gathers it, it's fine. But it's wrong if the United States gathers it. Right?

McGARVEY: I don't follow you.

CALLER: If Russia gathers intelligence, you're all for it...

McGARVEY: No, no. I'm just saying let's make our intelligence gathering a little more efficient.

CALLER: What?

McGARVEY: I said the purpose of my book is to improve the nature of our own intelligence collection. Now if that's pro-communist, you and I are on a different wave length.

CALLER: Well, I've only read a few chapters of your book, but...

McGARVEY: Read the rest of it and give me a call.

CALLER: ...But you just sound -- okay.

FISKE: Okay?

McGARVEY: Keep the faith.

CALLER: Good luck.

McGARVEY: Thank you very much.

FISKE: Pat, you talk about this business of classification of materials. And if I can recall, you say in your book that eighty-five percent of all the classified information that you handled during your fourteen years shouldn't have been classified.

McGARVEY: Yes. Yes, this is true. You have a couple of problems prevailing within the intelligence community. One, if you're working on a particular problem and you depend upon six or eight sources of information, many of which -- maybe seven of them are unclassified and one is classified. There's just a bit of status involved in getting your reports or your analyses read by stamping them top secret. If you stamp your report unclassified or confidential, odds are it won't get past the secretary in the front office and it won't get read. There's a mystique about top secret being the inner cult, the direct line to the Creator almost.

So many classification stamps are affixed simply to draw attention to the document itself. And in the whole field, the whole spectrum of intelligence, I don't -- I'm reluctant to assign hard statistics -- but I would say eighty to eighty-five percent, the great bulk of solid, hard intelligence information that our government makes judgments upon, is really unclassified information. It's a good, close reading of the daily press, the daily radio. It's a good, close contact with what is going on in the diplomatic, political and military area...

FISKE: You mean that our intelligence gathering agencies, for the most part, don't come up with much information that is not contained in the daily newspapers?

McGARVEY: John Kennedy said at a press conference in 1963 when asked about intelligence -- and he said some days I get more out of the New York Times. Lyndon Johnson said it in a press conference -- that there's a few secrets we have in government. And he said, but give the newspapers and TV a week, and they know them too.

FISKE: Well what does this do for the whole premise upon which your, you know, intelligence gathering apparatus is based?

McGARVEY: Well, this is one of the problems as I see

it. I think we've got to re-ask some very basic, fundamental questions: define the role that intelligence is to play in our government, define the amount of secrecy that's actually and realistically required in intelligence operations, and take a very hard look at the technological side of intelligence. Simply because we devise a new black box or a new method of collecting information should not be ample justification for the implementation of a very expensive collection program so that you know that the left toenail on that man in the bed that I spoke of earlier is longer than the toenails on his right foot. Does that really help our government, that kind of information?

FISKE: When you said that we should set a priority, we should decide what we want our intelligence operation to accomplish, what do you think it should accomplish?

McGARVEY: Well, it's a big one, Fred.

FISKE: No, it's basic. It's the starting point, isn't it?

McGARVEY: Well, right. Okay. I think, essentially, you're talking about the most likely candidate for us to go to war with. Now I would even question whether today that's the Soviet Union and China. My lower intestines tell me that our next war is quite likely to be of the nature of the Vietnam war in an area of the world where we don't have a direct, you know, superpower confrontation. But nevertheless...

FISKE: But since we don't know, isn't this the reason that -- isn't this the reason that we get our information about everybody?

McGARVEY: That's right. Well -- well, nevertheless, just to stay with the basic issue. Because the Soviet Union and China are superpowers, we've got to focus our attention on them to devise what -- to learn what they're up to. But we don't have to know, to the degree that we know today, exactly every little move, everytime they change a tube in a radar set in Minsk, Siberia...

FISKE: Yes. But who makes the judgment about what's important for us to know and what's not?

McGARVEY: That's the point right there. It's this great amorphous mass, this great bureaucratic structure that surrounds the technical collection program. And it -- I guess it would -- well, it shreds out in the Pueblo example to a Navy lieutenant, a fellow about twenty-five years old, who was sitting in the -- an intelligence job in Japan, got a letter from his -- a friend of his who was working at Navy headquarters in Hawaii

and the friend was lamenting the fact that we're not paying much attention to North Korea these days, everybody's focusing on Vietnam. So this fellow, his task was to devise a route for the Pueblo to sail. Based on that letter from his friend, he devised that the Pueblo should sail up around North Korea and figure out what's going on up there.

And then of course the -- the later investigation of the Pueblo, which again was never revealed publicly -- all of the targets that the Pueblo was working against were already being very adequately covered by the Air Force, who were flying sixty missions a month over that area, and by three land-based collection sites in both Japan and South Korea.

FISKE: But this -- one hand doesn't know what the other is doing.

McGARVEY: Exactly. Right.

FISKE: 589-9912, Empathy.

MAN: Yes. Hello, Fred?

FISKE: Yes. You're on the air.

MAN: All right. I'd like to applaud Mr. McGarvey's conversation. It's really the first honest breakdown I've heard of the, you know, intelligence atmosphere, intelligence community. I worked for three years with the Special Security Group for the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence for the Army. And it's like reliving old times. I was -- I only got out a year ago. But...

FISKE: Maddening times too, I'll bet.

MAN: Pardon me?

FISKE: Maddening times too, I'll bet.

MAN: Yes.

FISKE: You think you're in another world.

MAN: You know, the penny ante stuff -- the New York Times, you know, run the bill: we had two desks that their sole job was to read the New York Times and clip articles and report security violation.

McGARVEY: Yes. And -- and when I was at DIA we had to take those same articles and write fact sheets on them...

MAN: Right. Right.

McGARVEY: ...and try to divine how they got ahold

of this information.

MAN: Right, exactly.

McGARVEY: And you know -- how the hell are we supposed to know?

MAN: That's exactly right.

McGARVEY: That was like busy-work, right? Beautiful.

MAN: Well, you know, as -- as was said before, it kept a lot of people busy.

McGARVEY: It sure did.

MAN: And, you know, some of the things like the -- well, the Special Security Group, we work, you know, with DIA, CIA, and our own and so forth. And things like monitoring a conference: one of our -- one of the people from our unit would go up to a conference room -- oh, and we worked in the Pentagon -- and we would have to stay in the conference room while Pentagon counterintelligence would come in and sweep the room for microphones and so forth.

FISKE: Yes.

MAN: Well, inevitably each conference room in the Pentagon -- I'm sure Mr. McGarvey...

McGARVEY: I've been in too many of those conference rooms.

MAN: ...it has a podium, you know, that costs about thirty thousand dollars.

McGARVEY: Right.

MAN: I mean, it -- you push the button, the podium goes up, and lights flash and bells and so forth. And the podium has a microphone. Now, each conference room is relatively small, and you don't really need, you know, this gigantic podium with the speaker system; but every room has it.

McGARVEY: You know why they have that?

MAN: Why is that?

McGARVEY: It's my personal contention that once a man makes general he doesn't know how to read any more. He has to be briefed.

FISKE: Yes.

MAN: Yes, that's entirely possible. But -- all right. The whole thing about this was, you know, with the amplification system in the room the sound was loud enough so that most of the days -- and very seldom would you have a double door concept, it would be a curtain, you know, inside the door -- and there was enough space under the door so any individual standing outside the hallway, you know, could hear the briefing. And yet you had to go through this whole thing, you know: Pentagon counterintelligence coming in with their little machines.

FISKE: Yes.

MAN: And you had to have a man stationed there so that nobody could break into the room before the briefing was to take place.

McGARVEY: My wife put it adequately: when we were going through the training program, we used to have to go through this elaborate routine of slipping off on late Sunday night and arriving at this rural training facility; and when I was leaving every Sunday night to go back for another week of training, she would sing to me, "M-I-C-K-E-Y M-O-U-S-E."

FISKE: That must have made you feel real great, right?

McGARVEY: I said, "She doesn't know. She doesn't understand. A woman's got problems."

MAN: I tell you, when I was -- I served as an enlisted man.

McGARVEY: Same here. Same here.

MAN: And, you know, I probably didn't take it as seriously -- you know, we -- we'd keep track of the -- the compartment of accesses, you know: SI, P, K, and B, you know. And I didn't take it as seriously as obviously a career officer would, being concerned about officer efficiency reports and so forth. And it was really almost sad, you know, I...

McGARVEY: Well, I -- I saw an officer's career ruined for that exact Mickey Mouse that you're talking about. There was a situation where a colonel of infantry was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was supposed to set up, as this fellow on the phone talked about, an interdepartmental conference in one of the rooms. And he went through all of the elaborate preparations for it. And in the process of getting all these steps on the check list completed, he left a Manila folder on the desk that did have classified information in there. And he went out to -- to greet the people and to get them in there. And in the moment that he stepped out to meet these guys in the hallway, one of these CI goons took another sweep

through, found this document on the desk and report, turned it in for a violation of security. And literally it really ruined this guy's career. He was slated to get a -- a battalion or a regimental command overseas, and they -- they detoured him from that. They took away all of his security clearances and transferred him to the military district of Washington and he became an officer of the day room. You know. It's just -- it's so tragic.

MAN: You know, there are valid instances where this kind of -- I'm not sure if this instance was or not. But, you know, if -- if that individual -- say, it had the clippings of the New York Times, which had been classified after they'd been cut out of the paper, and for this reason his career was jeopardized, you know, I think this is really sad...

McGARVEY: Yes.

MAN: ...and, you know, a definite comment on our society.

FISKE: Listen, thank you very much for your call.

MAN: All righty. Thank you.

FISKE: Let me pause here for a moment. Then we'll take some more calls for Patrick McGarvey, whose book is titled "CIA: The Myth and the Madness." The phone number is 589-9912.

* * *

FISKE: 589-9912, Empathy. Hello?

MAN: Hello?

FISKE: You're on the air, sir.

MAN: Okay. I have a question.

FISKE: Go ahead.

MAN: What does the CIA represent?

McGARVEY: It represents the top of a pyramid of 150,000 people which funnels information up to the President.

MAN: Could you explain that better, please?

McGARVEY: Well...

FISKE: Are you -- are you asking literally what the letters "CIA" mean?

MAN: Yes.

McGARVEY: Central Intelligence Agency.

FISKE: Okay?

MAN: Yes. Can anybody get help from 'em?

FISKE: Get help from them?

MAN: Yes.

McGARVEY: That depends on what your problem is. What kind of help are you looking for?

FISKE: Are you talking about as an individual? Can an individual go to the CIA with a problem?

MAN: Yes.

FISKE: I think the answer would have to be no.

McGARVEY: That's correct.

MAN: Well, who can get help from 'em?

FISKE: Huh? They're there to service -- to serve the President of the United States and the government, to provide it with information which is regarded as vital to our security.

McGARVEY: That's correct.

FISKE: Okay?

MAN: Okay.

FISKE: All right. Thank you.

Empathy?

MAN: Could I ask you a question, a personal question of Mr. McGarvey?

FISKE: Turn your radio down, please.

MAN: Yes. Just a minute.

FISKE: Okay. Please, folks, when you call turn your radios down or it just kills...

MAN: Can I ask a personal question of Mr. McGarvey?

McGARVEY: Yes. Go right ahead.

MAN: What was your name before you changed it to McGarvey?

McGARVEY: McNamara.

MAN: That's what I thought.

FISKE: Why did you ask that question?

MAN: No comment.

FISKE: All right. Okay. 589-9912, this is Empathy.

MAN: Yes. I was calling regarding to that last guy that called in about the guy that got railroaded on CIA, for finding some information.

FISKE: All right. Go ahead.

MAN: Well, I just wanted to say that the same thing happened to me. I was working over there at nighttime, over there in Langley, Virginia.

FISKE: Uh huh.

MAN: And I found some classified information, and I called for a guard and the guard came. Then the next morning they called my house and told my wife that I wasn't to come on the premises anymore. And so I got mad and I said, "The heck with this," so I went on over to CIA. And Husbein (?) was in charge of security at the time. And it just goes to show you how they can take a honest American, you know, and really make him feel down and out, you know.

FISKE: Uh huh.

MAN: And I really got railroaded.

McGARVEY: Well, they got their rules. I would question some of the rules.

FISKE: Okay? Good luck to you.

MAN: Bye-bye.

FISKE: I liked the -- I was interested in the part of your book, Pat, in which you discussed the information which the various intelligence agencies gather concerning people in this country, biographical data and information. They accumulate dossiers do they?

McGARVEY: Well, I -- I felt almost now, you know, with the Watergate business -- I felt almost prescient when I see what's happened. I -- I stated in there that the Army sort of got into that sideways in 1968, and that it was a bungled effort. They were going around, you know, following a candidate

on the campaign trail and that sort of thing, under the guise or the rationale that civil disorders are in their bailiwick, their area of concern, they have to know what's going on. They could have done an awful lot better simply by writing to each congressman's office or each potential candidate's campaign office and asking to be put on the mailing list for press handouts and for -- for schedules and that sort of thing.

The -- the idea created by that domestic spying was that there's a conspiracy afoot. You almost picture the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence daily fingering through these dossiers and -- and feeding the Secretary of Defense hot political inside information about potential Republican or Democratic candidates. The reality is that the Army Chief of Staff of Intelligence didn't even know the program was going on, that it was one of these half-hearted efforts. I think Art Buchwald summarized it beautifully when he said that the whole thing got started because a master sergeant at Fort Holabird found five GIs play crap in the barracks, and that he told them to get out of the barracks and get working; and of course they were in Army intelligence, so they started scouting around and -- and surveilling people. Now, of course that's Buchwald's...

FISKE: Yes.

McGARVEY: ...ideas, but it's not too far removed from reality when you stop and think about it.

A lot of these things get started quite by accident. And there's no one...

FISKE: Nobody coordinates?

McGARVEY: No, you can't shut it off. For example, they've been trying now to get the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army to document that all of those dossiers have been destroyed. And the way that information is -- is ingested into the computer systems and they way they interlock with each other's agencies, you'll never know if that information is destroyed.

FISKE: Pat, can you stand by for five minutes of news?

McGARVEY: Sure.

FISKE: Take a few more questions? We'll pause for five minutes of news, then be back with Patrick McGarvey, whose book is titled "CIA: The Myth and the Madness." Please hold those calls till after the news, okay?

* * *

FISKE: Our Empathy guest is Patrick J. McGarvey. He's a former intelligence agent, fourteen years of service, who's written a book titled "CIA: The Myth and the Madness," published by Saturday Review Press.

We'll take some calls for him at 589-9912 in just a moment.

* * *

FISKE: Hello. This is Empathy.

CHILD: Hello?

FISKE: You're on the air.

CHILD: I want to know if Mr. McGarvey has any children that understand what he was doing.

McGARVEY: I have four children, and they understand basically what I was doing; they don't know all the grimy details.

CHILD: Oh.

FISKE: Uh huh.

CHILD: Okay.

FISKE: Okay?

CHILD: Okay.

FISKE: Okay. 589-9912. This is Empathy.

MAN: Hello. There have been rumors and stories to the effect that the CIA was involved in the Mossedegh (?) overthrow in Iran and the Guatemala incident, I believe in '54, a couple of years later. Do you know whether there is actually any factual information to back that up?

McGARVEY: I think that's been adequately documented in the public record. Yes, they were involved intricately in both of those operations.

MAN: What about Lebanon in '58?

McGARVEY: I don't know of that.

MAN: Okay. Thank you.

FISKE: One of the difficulties apparently results from a competition between different intelligence gathering

agencies, like the CIA and the DIA, and there're a few others too -- the FBI. Is there nobody who coordinates this who can do away with that kind of thing?

McGARVEY: Well, on paper, the entire intelligence structure, which is a very intricate structure, looks good. There're staffs and there're coordinating committees, and the flow charts all indicate that there's an adequate check and balance system in there. But just in the operation in the work-a-day world, it doesn't work that way. For example, in Saigon in April of 1964 when the first evidence that the North Vietnamese Army was coming into South Vietnam came into intelligence, the J-2 intelligence shop in Saigon at the military headquarters told the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency that they would take over handling all the order of battle information, which is -- you know, that's what that's known as -- the collecting of information by organized means.

Now the intelligence charter by the National Security Council clearly says this is a responsibility that's supposed to be carried out at the Pentagon, because history has shown that a field commander weighs intelligence with things other than good intelligence production in his mind when he reports back up his channels.

Well, the result was that throughout the Vietnam war all of the basic intelligence data about the strength of the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam was produced by the military headquarters in Saigon. The result was that in Saigon CIA staff officers working there had to sit down and write a contact report everytime they had a lunch or drank a beer with an American GI who worked in MAC V intelligence. So we had an intelligence war within a war. And, you know...

FISKE: So not only do you have this competition with the British, for example...

McGARVEY: That's correct. Right.

FISKE: ...Among the intelligence agencies in this country to show one another up.

McGARVEY: Uh-huh.

FISKE: And they duplicate activity and, I would suppose, technology as well, resulting in far greater expense.

McGARVEY: Exactly. Right.

FISKE: 589-9912. This is "Empathy."

MAN: Hello.

FISKE: You're on the air, sir.

MAN: Yes, sir. I would like to ask the question, when did Mr. McGarvey write this book?

McGARVEY: It was published in October. I wrote it -- I finished writing it about August of 1971. It took me about a year.

MAN: And at that time you were employed by whom?

McGARVEY: What's -- what's the purpose of your question?

MAN: Well, I want to know...

McGARVEY: I was...

MAN: Did you write it? Did you write it on your own time or on government time?

McGARVEY: Let's say I was self-employed.

MAN: Pardon?

McGARVEY: I was self-employed.

MAN: You were self-employed.

McGARVEY: That's right.

MAN: Well, that sort of conflicts with what I've been hearing on the radio.

McGARVEY: What have you been hearing on the radio?

MAN: Huh? Well, I'm listening to it right now.

McGARVEY: I wasn't working for intelligence at the time, if that's what your question is...

MAN: Yes, that's right. And you were in intelligence (?). That's the U. S. government, right?

McGARVEY: I left intelligence in 1969. I was working for a magazine.

MAN: What magazine?

McGARVEY: It's called "Government Executive Magazine." It's a private enterprise...

MAN: Oh, that's a new one. Okay.

McGARVEY: No connection with government.

MAN: Right. Thank you.

FISKE: Let me pause here for a moment...

NEW YORK TIMES
18 NOV 1972

C.I.A. MYSTERY: PERU'S ANCHOVIES

Agency Takes Up a Problem of Sea Currents and Fish

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17—The Central Intelligence Agency's thirst for worldwide intelligence has turned to Peruvian anchovies and a "mysterious" warm current in the Pacific that made the fish disappear this year.

A lengthy classified Intelligence Memorandum, prepared last month by the C.I.A.'s Office of Economic Research and obtained today by The New York Times, reported that the warm current, known as "Elniño de Navedad" ("Christmas Child") had driven the anchovies from their feeding grounds and beyond the reach of Peruvian fishing fleets.



The New York Times/Nov. 18, 1972

This year warm currents (heavy arrows) have penetrated the anchovy fishing grounds despite the Humboldt Current.

Inasmuch as the processing of the anchovies into fish meal is Peru's foremost manufacturing activity — providing employment for tens of thousands of workers aboard the fishing boats and in coastal factories and supplying 30 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings—the unusually early arrival of the current is a ma[illegible] economy.

The C. I. A. also discovered that the vagaries of the current are already having an impact on worldwide prices of fish-meal-based livestock feeds and, consequently, on cattle and poultry prices. It may even hurt commodity dealers in the United States and West Germany.

The C.I.A. explained that anchovies thrive in the cool waters of the north-moving Humboldt Current. Every December, warm currents move south to northern Peru, but by March they are pushed away by the Humboldt Current.

But every seven years the warm currents, for unknown reasons, push far south of their normal range, forcing away the anchovies and curtailing catches sharply.

"Peruvians call this phenomenon El Nino de Navedad because it usually appears off their shores during the holiday season," the C.I.A. said.

But this year when an excellent fishing season had been expected, the Humboldt Current was particularly weak, "allowing the Nino to last longer than usual," the memorandum continued.

By June, 1972, the C.I.A. reported, the anchovy catch "had fallen to only about 10 per cent of normal."

Peru had expected an output of two million tons of fish meal this year, but at the end of August the stocks had fallen to 325,000 tons and all exports were banned despite major export commitments.

The C.I.A. study concluded that following the subsequent ban on all fishing, "the fleet and fishmeal plants will lie idle for many months and unemployment will swell."

The memorandum warned that many fish-meal companies might collapse "if not kept afloat b y new government loans" and unless the Peruvian Government allowed "the least efficient firms to go under while assuming their debts and offering other jobs to their workers."

Furthermore, the C.I.A. said, Peru's revolutionary military government had relied heavily on fish-meal sales to cover the import requirements for its five-year . development plan, which includes oil and copper ventures and manufacturing.

Because Peru held large fish-meal stocks from last year's production, the C.I.A. said, she still may earn $270-million from these exports in 1972. Last yea sales brought $330-million.